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Abstract
In this paper, we show that the logic of GK is indeed a gen-
eral framework for nonmonotonic reasoning by embedding
general default logic into it. More importantly, we illustrate
that it is also a powerful tool for studying nonmonotonic for-
malisms. We ﬁrst show that checking for weak equivalence
and strong equivalence between two rule bases in general de-
fault logic can both be captured in the logic of GK and the
complexities for both problems are coNP complete. Then, we
show that each rulebase isstrongly equivalent to aset of rules
of normal form. Finally, we prove that auto-epistemic logic
is equivalent to a proper subset of general default logic, and
the self-introspection operator in auto-epistemic logic indeed
plays the same role as the double negation-as-failure operator
in general default logic.
Introduction
Recently, Zhou et al. (2007) proposed a nonmonotonic
logic, called general default logic, which extended both
Gelfond et al.’s disjunctive default logic (1991) (therefore
Reiter’s default logic (1980)) by allowing arbitrary nested
rule connectives and Ferraris’s general logic programming
(2005a) by allowing classical connectives.
However, many properties in relation to general default
logicremainunclear,forinstance,whetheritisastrictexten-
sionofdisjunctivedefaultlogic(orReiter’s defaultlogic). In
this paper, we aim to study some fundamental properties of
general default logic by embedding it into the logic of GK
(Lin & Shoham 1992).
The logic of knowledge and justiﬁed assumptions (the
logic of GK for short), proposedby Lin and Shoham(1992),
is a non-standard modal logic with two modal operators K
(for knowledge) and A (for assumptions). The logic of GK
is a general frameworkfor nonmonotonicformalisms. It has
beenshownintheearly1990sthatbothReiter’sdefaultlogic
(1980) and Moore’s auto-epistemic logic (1987) can be em-
bedded into the logic of GK. Recently, Lin and Zhou (2007)
showed that Ferraris’s general logic programming (2005a)
can be embedded into the logic of GK as well.
A question naturally arises whether general default logic
can also be embedded into the logic of GK. This paper an-
swers it positively. In section 3, we shall show that the logic
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of GK is ﬂexible enough to capture general default logic as
well. Thus, our result conﬁrms the generality of the logic of
GK.
More importantly, we shall also show that the logic of
GK is not only a general framework of nonmonotonic log-
ics but also a powerful tool to study them for three reasons.
Firstly, although the logic of GK is a non-standard logic, it
is based on a standard bi-modal logic. There are a lot of
useful existing techniques for modal logics, for instance, the
standard complexity analysis techniques (Halpern & Moses
1992). As an application of this aspect, in Section 4, we
shallﬁrst showthatbothweakequivalenceandstrongequiv-
alence in general default logic can be captured in the logic
of GK, and then show that the complexity of checking weak
equivalence and strong equivalence between two rules are
both coNP complete.
Secondly, there are many useful properties which can be
used in standard modal logic. For instance, K(P) ∧ K(Q)
is equivalent to K(P ∧ Q). As an application of this aspect,
in Section 5, we shall show that each rule base in general
default logic is strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the
following form:
C1 & ... & Cn & − Cn+1 & ... & − Cm ⇒
Cm+1 | ... | Ck | − Ck+1 | ... | − Cl, (1)
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ l) are propositional clauses. Moreover,
this form cannot be further transformed into disjunctive de-
fault rules. This shows that, to some extent, general default
logic is a strict extension of disjunctive default logic (thus
Reiter’s default logic).
Finally, as we mentioned earlier, the logic of GK is a
general framework of nonmonotonic logics. Thus, it can
serve as a platform for comparing different nonmonotonic
formalisms. As an application of this aspect, in Section
6, we shall show that Moore’s auto-epistemic logic (1987)
is equivalent to a proper subclass of general default logic.
As a consequence, the self-introspection operator in auto-
epistemic logic indeed plays the same role as the double
negation-as-failure operator in general default logic. Fur-
thermore, as Gottlob (1995) showed that auto-epistemic
logic can not be embedded into Reiter’s default logic by a
modulartranslation,this resultalso conﬁrmsthat generalde-
fault logic is a strict extension of Reiter’s default logic.Preliminaries
We begin by recalling the basic concepts of propositional
logic, general default logic and the logic of GK.
The classical propositional language L is deﬁned recur-
sively by a set Atom of atoms and a set of classical connec-
tives ⊥, ¬ and → as follows:
F ::= ⊥ | p | ¬F | F → F,
where p is an atom. ⊤, ∧, ∨ and ↔ are deﬁned as usual.
Formulas in L are called facts. A theory T is a set of facts
which is closed under classical entailment. Let Γ be a set of
facts, we write Th(Γ) to denote the logical closure of Γ un-
der classical entailment. We write Γ to represent the theory
Th(Γ) if clear from the context. A theory T is inconsistent
if there is a fact F such that F ∈ T and ¬F ∈ T, other-
wise T is consistent. Literals are atoms and their negations.
Clauses are disjunctions of sets of literals.
General default logic
The propositional rule language R (Zhou, Lin, & Zhang
2007) is deﬁned upon L by adding a set of rule connectives
⇒ (for rule implication), & (for rule and) and | (for rule
or):
R ::= F | R ⇒ R | R & R | R | R,
where F is a fact. −R and R ⇔ S are considered as short-
hands of R ⇒ ⊥ and (R ⇒ S) & (S ⇒ R) respectively.
− is for negation as failure (or rule negation); ⇔ is for rule
equivalence. Formulas in R are called rules. A rule base ∆
is a set of rules.
The satisfaction relation |=1 between theories and rules is
deﬁned recursively as follows:
• If R is a fact, then T |= R iff R is entailed by T in classi-
cal propositional logic.
• T |= R & S iff T |= R and T |= S;
• T |= R | S iff T |= R or T |= S;
• T |= R ⇒ S iff T  |= R or T |= S.
Thus, if T is consistent, then T |= −R iff T  |= R. If T is
inconsistent, then for every rule R, T |= R. We say that T
satisﬁes R, or T is a model of R iff T |= R.
The subrule relationship between two rules is deﬁned re-
cursively as follows:
• R is a subrule of R;
• R and S are subrules of R ⇒ S, R & S and R | S,
where R and S are rules.
The reduct of a rule R relative to a theory T, denoted by
RT, is the rule obtained from R by replacing each maximal
subrule of R which is not satisﬁed by T with ⊥. Let T be
a theory and ∆ a rule base, the reduct of ∆ relative to T,
denoted by ∆T, is the set of all the reducts of rules in ∆
relative to T.
1In this paper, we overload the notation |=. We use it to denote
the satisfaction relation in classical logic, general default logic, the
logic of GK and auto-epistemic logic. Which one it stands for
should be clear from the context.
Deﬁnition 1 (extensions) Let T be a theory and ∆ a rule
base. We say that T is an extension of ∆ iff:
1. T |= ∆T.
2. There is no theory T1 such that T1 ⊂ T and T1 |= ∆T.
We say that two rules are weakly equivalent if they have
the same set of models. The notion of weak equivalence, in-
troduced in (Zhou, Lin, & Zhang 2007), plays an important
role in computing extensions and simplifying default rules
after reduction. Notice that weak equivalence is not as the
same as equivalence deﬁned for default logic as usual. Two
rule bases are said to be equivalentiff they have the same set
of extensions. For instance, −p ⇒ q is equivalent to q since
bothofthemhavea uniqueextensionTh{q}. However,they
are not weakly equivalent. On the other hand, −p ⇒ q and
p | q are weakly equivalent but not equivalent.
Zhou et al. (2007) showed that Reiter’s default logic (Re-
iter 1980) in propositional case is a special case of general
default logic by restricting the rules of the following form
F & − G1 & ... & − Gn ⇒ H,
where n ≥ 0, F, Gi,(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and H are facts, and
F may be absent. Yet, under the context of Reiter’s default
logic, this form is represented as
F : M(¬G1),...,M(¬Gn)/H.
They also showed that Ferraris’s general logic program-
ming (Ferraris 2005a) is a special case of general default
logic by restricting the facts occurred in rules with atoms.
However, under the context of general logic programming,
rule connectives are represented by corresponding classical
connectives.
The logic of GK
The languageLGK of the logic of GK (Lin & Shoham1992)
is extended from L with two modal operators K (for knowl-
edge) and A (for assumption). Formulas in LGK are deﬁned
recursively as follows:
F ::= ⊥ | p | ¬F | F → F | K(F) | A(F),
where p ∈ Atom. ⊤, ∧, ∨ and ↔ are deﬁned the same
as in the classical modal logic. Formulas in LGK are called
GK formulas. Formulas constructed from K(F) and A(F),
whereF is a fact, and the connectives⊥, ¬ and→ are called
subjective formulas. In other words, subjective formulas are
those GK formulas without nested modal operator and each
atom p has to be in the scope of a modal operator.
A Kripke interpretation M is a tuple  W,π,RK,RA,s ,
whereW is anonemptyset, calledthesetofpossibleworlds,
π a function that maps Atom to the power set of W, RK
and RA binary relations on W, which represent the accessi-
bility relations for K and A respectively, and s ∈ W, called
the actual world of M. The satisfaction relation |= between
Kripke interpretations and GK formulas is deﬁned induc-
tively as follows:
• M  |= ⊥;
• If p ∈ Atom, M |= p iff s ∈ π(p);• M |= ¬F iff M  |= F;
• M |= F → G iff M  |= F or M |= G;
• M |= K(F) iff  W,π,RK,RA,w  |= F for any w ∈ W,
such that (s,w) ∈ RK;
• M |= A(F) iff  W,π,RK,RA,w  |= F for any w ∈ W,
such that (s,w) ∈ RA.
We say that a Kripke interpretation M satisﬁes a GK for-
mula F, or M is a model of F iff M |= F. We say that two
GK formulas are equivalent in the logic of GK if they have
the same set of models.
Let
K(M) = {F | F is a fact and M |= K(F)}
A(M) = {F | F is a fact and M |= A(F)}.
It is clear that both K(M) and A(M) are theories.
Deﬁnition 2 (GK Models) Let M be an interpretation and
F a formula. We say that M is a minimal model of F if
1. M is a model of F;
2. there is nointerpretationM1 suchthatM1 is alsoa model
of F and A(M1) = A(M), K(M1) ⊂ K(M).
We say that M is a GK model if M is a minimal model of F
and K(M) = A(M).
Embedding General Default Logic into the
Logic of GK
In this section, we show that general default logic can be
embedded into the logic of GK as well.
Let R be a rule in R. By RA we denote the GK formula
obtained from R by adding a modal operator A in front of
every fact and then replacing all occurrences of rule con-
nectives with corresponding classical connectives. By RGK
we denote the GK formula obtained from R recursively as
follows:
• If R is a fact, then RGK = K(R).
• If R is F & G, then RGK is FGK ∧ GGK.
• If R is F | G, then RGK is FGK ∨ GGK.
• If R is F ⇒ G, then RGK is (FGK → GGK) ∧ (FA →
GA).
Thus, if R is −F, then RGK is (FGK → ⊥) ∧ (FA → ⊥),
which is equivalent to ¬FGK ∧ ¬FA; if R is F ⇔ G, then
RGK is equivalent to (FGK ↔ GGK) ∧ (FA ↔ GA).
For every rule R, it is clear that both RA and RGK are
well deﬁned subjective formulas in LGK. Let ∆ be a rule
base. By ∆GK we denote the set of GK formulas:
∆GK = {RGK | R ∈ ∆}.
As general logic programmingis a special case of general
default logic, this mapping is a natural generalization of the
translation from general logic programminginto the logic of
GK proposed in (Lin & Zhou 2007).
Example 1 Let R be the rule −(p ∨ q) ⇒ ¬p | q. Then R
has a unique extension {¬p}. On the other hand, RGK is
((−p∨q)GK → (¬p)GK∨qGK)∧((−p∨q)A → (¬p)A∨qA),
which is which is equivalent to
(K(p∨q)∨K(p∨q)∨K¬p∨Kq)∧(A(p∨q)∨A¬p∨Aq),
which has a unique (in the sense that two interpretations M1
and M2 such that K(M1) = K(M2) and A(M1) = A(M2)
are the same) GK model M such that K(M) = A(M) =
Th({¬p}).
We shall show that generaldefault logic can be embedded
into the logic of GK with this mapping. We ﬁrst present the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 2 Let R be a rule and M an interpretation such
that K(M) = T1 and A(M) = T2. T1 |= RT2 iff M is a
model of RGK.
The following theorem shows that general default logic
can be embedded into the logic of GK with this mapping.
Theorem 2 Let ∆ be a rule base and T a consistent theory.
T is an extension of ∆ iff there is a GK model M of ∆GK
such that K(M) = A(M) = T.
The translation is not surprising since there are a large
number of similar translations (Lin & Shoham 1992; Lin
2002; Lin & Zhou 2007; Pearce, Tompits, & Woltran 2001;
Ferraris, Lee, & Lifschitz 2007) from answer set program-
ming or default logic into other nonmonotonic logics. Lin
and Shoham (1992) translated Reiter’s default logic into the
logic of GK. As a special case, Lin (2002) translated normal
logic programming into the logic of GK and showed that
checking strong equivalence between two normal logic pro-
grams can be reduced into classical propositional logic. Lin
andZhou(2007)extendedit intogenerallogicprogramming
and also lifted it into ﬁrst order case. Pearce et al. (2001)
showed that answer set programming can be translated into
QBF. Ferrariset al. (2007)translateda ﬁrst ordersentenceto
second order one and treated it as the answer set semantics
for ﬁrst order logic programs.
Of course, these translations work very well. However,
the intuitions behind them still remain unclear. Consider an-
other translation from general default logic into the logic of
GK as follows:
• If R is a fact, then RGK′ = K(R) ∧ A(R).
• IfR is F &G, thenRGK′ is (FGK′∧GGK′)∧(FA∧GA).
• If R is F |G, then RGK′ is (FGK′ ∨GGK′)∧(FA∨GA).
• If R is F ⇒ G, then RGK′ is (FGK′ → GGK′)∧(FA →
GA).
Thus, (−F)GK′ is ¬FGK′ ∧ ¬FA.
Proposition 3
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F) |= RGK ↔ RGK′.
Corollary 4 Let R be a rule. RGK and RGK′ have the
same set of GK models.
2See the appendix for some of the proof sketches.According to this reformulation, the intuitions behind our
translation are very clear. Roughly speaking, each rule con-
nective is transformed into the classical conjunction of two
parts of corresponding classical connective. Then, a ﬁxed
point semantics (here is the logic of GK) is used.
Another related result is due to Truszczy´ nski (2007). He
showed that (disjunctive) default logic can be embedded
into modal default theories in S4F. Clearly, his work can be
applied to general default logic as well. Lifschitz (1991)
also introduced another nonmonotonic modal logic, called
MKNF, and translated Reiter’s default logic into it.
The topic of which nonmonotonic modal logic (GK, S4F,
MKNF)is moreinterestingis beyondthescopeofthis paper.
Here, we are not intendingto arguewhich one is better since
each has its own merits. Forexample, S4F containsonly one
modal operator and then seems more natural, whilst MKNF
allows ﬁrst order components, which can be a basis for ﬁrst
order nonmonotonic logics (Motik & Rosati 2007). On the
other hand, the logic of GK is based on a standard bi-modal
language, which is simple and well studied. Since there are
many useful techniques and properties for standard modal
logics, we can take advantages of them. As an example, in
the next two sections, we study weak equivalence, strong
equivalence, and normal forms in general default logic via
the logic of GK.
Weak Equivalence, Strong Equivalence and
Complexity Issues
In this section, we ﬁrst show that the satisﬁability problem
for subjective formulas in the logic of GK is NP complete.
Then we show that checking weak equivalence and strong
equivalence can both be reduced into checking the validity
of a certain subjective formula in the logic of GK.
Ladner (1977) showed that every satisﬁable S5 formula
F must have a model polynomial in the length of F. Then
he proved that the satisﬁability problem for S5 is NP com-
plete. Halpern and Moses (1992) proved the same result for
KD45. Thus, the satisﬁability problem for KD45 is also
NP complete.
Here, we prove a similar result for subjective formulas in
the logic of GK. All the complexity results addressed in this
section mainly follow from the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let F be a subjective formula in LGK. F is
satisﬁable iff F has a model with at most 2|F| + 1 possible
worlds, where |F| is the length of the formula F.
Notice that Proposition 5 only holds for subjective for-
mulas in LGK. It does not hold in the general case since the
language LGK is a standard modal logic language with two
modal operators, whose satisﬁability problem is generally
beyond NP complete (Halpern & Moses 1992).
Similar to the NP completeness proof of satisﬁability of
S5 (Ladner 1977) and KD45 (Halpern & Moses 1992), we
have the following result.
Corollary 6 The complexity of checking whether a subjec-
tive formula is satisﬁable is NP complete.
The following theorem shows that checking weak equiva-
lence between two rules can be captured in the logic of GK.
Theorem 7 Let R1 and R2 be two rules. R1 and R2 are
weakly equivalent iff (R1)A and (R2)A are equivalent in
the logic of GK.
Thus, checking weak equivalence can be reduced into
checking the validity of a subjective formula in the logic of
GK.
Corollary 8 Checking whether two rules are weakly equiv-
alent is in coNP.
The notion of strong equivalence, proposed by Lifschitz
et al. (2001) for logic programs, plays a crucial role in an-
swer set programming. Lin and Zhou (2007) showed that
checking strong equivalence between two general logic pro-
grams can be captured in the logic of GK. The notion of
strongequivalenceis introducedinto default logic by Turner
(2001). Here, we show that the strong equivalence relation-
ship between two rules can be captured in the logic of GK
as well.
We say that two rules R1 and R2 are strongly equivalent,
denoted by R1 ≡ R2, if for every rule R3, R1 & R3 has the
same set of extensions as R2 & R3.
Given a rule R, we specify
Fact(R) = {F | F is a fact, F is a subrule of R}.
Theorem 9 Let R1 and R2 be two rules. The following four
statements are equivalent:
1. R1 and R2 are strongly equivalent.
2.
V
F∈Fact(R1 & R2) K(F) → A(F) |= (R1)GK ↔
(R2)GK.
3.
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F) |= (R1)GK ↔ (R2)GK.
4. For every rule R3 such that R1 is a subrule of it, and R4
be the rule obtained from R3 by replacing each occur-
rence of R1 into R2, R3 has the same set of extensions as
R4.
Theorem 7 and Theorem 9 are convenient for checking
whether or not two rules are weak equivalent or strongly
equivalent.
Example 2 Let −p ⇒ q and p|q be two rules. We have that
(−p ⇒ q)A is ¬Ap → Aq, which is equivalent to Ap ∨ Aq.
On the other hand, (p | q)A is Ap ∨ Aq. This shows that
−p ⇒ q and p | q are weakly equivalent. However, (−p ⇒
q)GK is ((¬Ap ∧ ¬Kp) → Kq) ∧ (¬Ap → Aq), which is
equivalentto Ap∨Kq under
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F). On the
other hand, (p | q)GK is Kp | Kq. Obviously, they are not
equivalent in the logic of GK. Thus, −p ⇒ q and p | q are
not strongly equivalent.
Theorem 9 shows that checking whether two rules are
strongly equivalent can be reduced into checking whether
a certain GK formula is valid. Since this GK formula (the
formula in Condition 2, Theorem 9) is exactly a subjective
formula and polynomial in the length of these two rules, we
have the following result.
Corollary 10 Checking whether two rules are strongly
equivalent in general default logic is in coNP.
Finally, we show that both checking weak equivalence
and checking strong equivalence between two rules are
coNP hard by the following lemma.Lemma 11 Let F and G be two facts. F is equivalent to G
in classical propositional logic iff F is weakly equivalent to
G iff F is strongly equivalent to G.
Theorem 12 The complexity of checking both whether two
rules are strongly equivalent and whether two rules are
weakly equivalent are coNP complete.
The notion of strong equivalence can be extended for rule
bases. Given two rule bases ∆1 and ∆2, we say that ∆1 is
strongly equivalent to ∆2 if for every rule base ∆3, ∆1 ∪
∆3 has the same set of extensions as ∆2 ∪ ∆3. Obviously,
Theorem 7, 9 and 12 holds for rule bases as well.
Truszczy´ nski (2007) showed that strong equivalence be-
tween default theories can be captured in S4F according to
his translation. However, the complexity issue is not ad-
dressed in his approach.
Normal Forms of General Default Logic
In this section, we show that each rule base can be strongly
equivalently transformed into a set of rules of form (1). The
key technique of proving this is Theorem 9.
By Theorem 9, we have that
Proposition 13 Let F and G be two facts. F ∧G ≡ F &G.
Corollary 14 Each rule R is strongly equivalent to a rule
R1 such that Fact(R1) is a set of clauses.
Proposition 13 also indicates that the two connectives &
and ∧ coincide with each other to some extent.
Furthermore, the following proposition describes more
strongly equivalent transformations.
Proposition 15 For any rules F, G, H and R,
1. F & G is strongly equivalent to {F,G}.
2. −⊥ ≡ ⊤, −⊤ ≡ ⊥
3. F & ⊥ ≡ ⊥, F | ⊥ ≡ F;
4. F & ⊤ ≡ F, F | ⊤ ≡ ⊤;
5. F & G ≡ G & F, F | G ≡ G | F;
6. F &(G&H) ≡ (F &G)&H, F |(G|H) ≡ (F |G)|H;
7. F & (G | H) ≡ (F & G) | (F & H), F | (G & H) ≡
(F | G) & (F | H).
8. −(F & G) ≡ −F | − G, −(F | G) ≡ −F & − G;
9. − − −F ≡ −F;
10. −(F ⇒ G) ≡ − − F & − G;
11. (F | G) ⇒ H ≡ (F ⇒ H) & (G ⇒ H);
12. F ⇒ (G & H) ≡ (F ⇒ G) & (F ⇒ H);
13. (F ⇒ G)|H is strongly equivalentto {F ⇒ G|H,H| −
F | − −G};
14. (F ⇒ G) & R ⇒ H is strongly equivalent to {G & R ⇒
H,R ⇒ F | H | − G,R ⇒ H | − −F};
15. F ⇒ (G ⇒ H) is strongly equivalent to {F & G ⇒
H,F ⇒ −G | − −H};
16. F & − −G ⇒ H ≡ F ⇒ H | − G;
17. F ⇒ G | − −H ≡ F & − H ⇒ G.
By Corollary 14 and 1-9 in Proposition 15, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 16 Each rule base without ⇒ and ⇔ is
strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the following form
C1|...|Cn|−Cn+1|...|−Cm|−−Cm+1|...|−−Ck, (2)
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ k) are propositional clauses.
Proposition 17 Each rule of the form −R is strongly equiv-
alent to a set of rules of the following form
−C1 | ... | − Cn | − −Cn+1 | ... | − −Cm, (3)
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ m) are propositional clauses.
By Proposition 15 and Proposition 16,
Theorem 18 Each rule base is strongly equivalent to a set
of rules of the following form:
C1 & ... & Cn & − Cn+1 & ... & − Cm ⇒
Cm+1 | ... | Ck | − Ck+1 | ... | − Cl,
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ l) are propositional clauses.
Notice that form (1) can not further be strongly equiva-
lently transformed into a set of disjunctive default rules in
(Gelfond et al. 1991). A simple example is p | − p, where
p is an atom. This, to some extent, indicates that general de-
fault logic is more expressive than disjunctive default logic
(thus Reiter’s default logic).
As stated in (Zhou, Lin, & Zhang 2007), general logic
programming (Ferraris 2005a) is a special case of general
default logic by restricting facts into atoms, Theorem 18
can be viewed as a generalization of recent work of Cabalar
and Ferraris (2007), who provedthat each general logic pro-
gram can be strongly equivalently transformed into a set of
extended disjunctive rules. Moreover, Theorem 18 also in-
dicates that general answer set programming with classical
negation also has a similar normal form result.
On the Relationships between Default Logics
and Auto-epistemic Logic
Auto-epistemic is another dominant formalism for non-
monotonic reasoning. The relationships between default
logic and nonmonotonic reasoning is, of course, one of the
most important topics in nonmonotonicreasoning.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce Moore’s auto-epistemic logic
(Moore 1987) and related issues. The language LAEL of
auto-epistemic logic is extended from L with a modal oper-
ator L for self introspection. Formulas in LAEL are deﬁned
recursively as follows:
F ::= ⊥ | p | ¬F | F → F | L(F),
where p ∈ Atom. ⊤, ∧, ∨ and ↔ are deﬁned as usual.
Formulas in LAEL are called AEL formulas.
Let Γ be a set of AEL formulas. A set E of AEL formulas
is a stable expansion of Γ if:
E = Th(Γ ∪ {L(F) | F ∈ E} ∪ {¬L(F) | F  ∈ E}).
A stable expansion is uniquely determined by the set of
propositional formulas in it. This is called the kernel of a
stable expansion (Konolige 1988). Hence, we can identify a
stable extension with its kernel, which is obviously a propo-
sitional theory.Konolige (1988) proved that for every set Γ of AEL for-
mulas, there is a set Γ′ of AEL formulas of the following
form
¬L(F) ∨ L(G1) ∨ ... ∨ L(Gn) ∨ H (4)
such that Γ′ has the same set of stable expansions with Γ,
where n ≥ 0, F, Gi,(1 ≤ i ≤ n) andH are facts, F may be
absent. Based on Konolige’s result, Lin and Shoham (1992)
showed that Moore’s auto-epistemic logic can be embedded
into the logic of GK by translating each AEL formula of the
form (4) into
¬A(F) ∨ A(G1) ∨ ... ∨ A(Gn) ∨ K(H).
Theorem 19 (Lin and Shoham (1992)) Let Γ be a set of
AEL formulas with form (4). A theory T is the kernel of
a stable expansion of a set Γ of AEL formulas iff there is a
GK model M of ΓGK such that K(M) = T.
Now we show that auto-epistemic logic can be embedded
into general default logic via the logic of GK. Without loss
of generality, we consider AEL formulas of form (4). Let S
be an AEL formula of the form
¬L(F) ∨ L(G1) ∨ ... ∨ L(Gn) ∨ H.
By Θ(S) we denote the following rule
− − −F | − −G1 | ... | − −Gn | H.
A set Γ of AEL formulas with form (4) is translated into the
rule base Θ(Γ) = {Θ(S) | S ∈ Γ}.
It is easy to see that (Θ(S))GK is equivalent to SGK un-
der
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F) inthe logicofGK. Therefore,the
following result follows directly from Theorem 2 and 19.
Theorem 20 A theory T is the kernel of a stable expansion
of a set Γ of AEL formulas iff T is an extension of Θ(Γ).
On the other hand, suppose that RA is the subclass of R
such that each rule in RA is a set of rules of the form:
− − −F | − −G1 | ... | − −Gn | H.
IncontrastwithTheorem20,wehavethefollowingresult.
Theorem 21 A theory T is an extension of a rule base ∆ in
RA iff T is the kernel of a stable expansion of Θ−1(∆),
where Θ−1 translates each rule in RA of the form − −
−F | −−G1| ... | −−Gn|H into ¬L(F)∨L(G1)∨...∨
L(Gn) ∨ H.
According to Theorem 20 and Theorem 21, it can be con-
cluded that auto-epistemic logic is equivalent to RA, which
is a subclass of general default logic. Moreover, the self
introspection operator L indeed plays the same role as the
double negation as failure operator −−.
We may be interested in whether a translation is modular
ornot. Roughspeaking,amodulartranslationmeansthatthe
translation can be applied one by one. Modularity is impor-
tant in translation among non-monotonic formalisms both
from a conceptual and computationalpoint of view (Gottlob
1995). We saythatatranslationtr fromauto-epistemiclogic
into general default logic is modular iff for any two sets Γ1
and Γ2 of AEL formulas, tr(Γ1 ∪Γ2) = tr(Γ1)∪tr(Γ2). It
is obvious that our translation from auto-epistemic logic to
general default logic is a modular translation.
AsGottlobpointedoutin(Gottlob1995),thereisnomod-
ular translation from Reiter’s default logic to auto-epistemic
logic. Thenheconcludedthatauto-epistemiclogicis strictly
more expressive than Reiter’s default logic. Hence, our re-
sult shows that, in the sense of Gottlob’s idea of expressive-
ness, general default logic is a non-trivial extension of Re-
iter’s default logic.
Janhunen (1999) proposed another perspective on com-
paringexpressivenessamongnonmonotonicformalisms. He
also adopted Gottlob’s idea of translation as a basic tool.
However, in contrast, auxiliary atoms are allowed to intro-
duce. Interestingly, he concluded that, on the contrary, Re-
iter’s default logic is more expressive than auto-epistemic
logic. We believe that it is important to prohibit new atoms
since they also bring new information. Another reason
comes from Ferraris’s recent work (Ferraris 2005b), which
proves that, in terms of expressiveness among classes of
answer set programs, modular translation without auxiliary
atoms is identical to strong equivalence.
Ferraris’s idea of treatingstrong equivalenceas a criterion
for expressiveness can be generalized into default logic as
well. Reiter’s default logic (Gelfond et al.’s disjunctive de-
fault logic) can also be considered as a subclass RN (RD)
of general default logic by restricting the rules into Reiter’s
original default rules (disjunctive default rules). Moreover,
RN (RD) is distinct with RA. That is, there exists a rule in
RN (RD), for instance p ⇒ q, which is not strongly equiv-
alent to any rules in RA. On the other hand, there exists a
rule in RA, for instance − − −p | q, which is not strongly
equivalentto any rules in RN (RD). Hence, Reiter’s default
logic (Gelfond et al.’s disjunctive default logic) and Moore’s
auto-epistemic logic are indeed two disjoint nonmonotonic
formalisms. However, both of them are subclasses of gen-
eral default logic. This also conﬁrms that general default
logic is a non-trivial extension of Reiter’s default logic (dis-
junctive default logic).
The three subclasses of general logic can be compared
by considering the normal forms of them respectively under
strong equivalence.
Theorem 22 1. EachruleinRN (i.e. Reiter’sdefaultlogic)
is strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the following
form
C1 & ... & Cn & − Cn+1 & ... & − Cm ⇒ Cm+1,
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1) are propositional clauses.
2. Each rule in RD ((i.e. disjunctive default logic)) is
strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the following form
C1&... &Cn&−Cn+1& ... &−Cm ⇒ Cm+1| ... |Ck,
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ k) are propositional clauses.
3. Each rule in RA (corresponding to auto-epistemic logic)
is strongly equivalent to a set of rules of the following
form
−C1 & ... & − Cn ⇒ −Cn+1 | ... | − Cm | Cm+1,
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1) are propositional clauses.Conclusion
The contribution of this paper are three folds. Firstly, we
showed that the logic of GK (Lin & Shoham 1992) is in-
deed a general framework for nonmonotonic reasoning by
embeddinggeneral default logic (Zhou,Lin, & Zhang 2007)
into it. We also clariﬁed the intuitions behind this transla-
tion and other similar translations amongnonmonotonicfor-
malisms (Lin & Shoham 1992; Lin 2002; Lin & Zhou 2007;
Pearce, Tompits, & Woltran 2001; Ferraris, Lee, & Lifschitz
2007) by reformulating another equivalent translation.
Secondly, we demonstrated that the logic of GK is not
only a general framework of nonmonotonic formalisms but
also a powerful tool to study them. This is not pointed
out by previous work (Lin & Shoham 1992; Lin 2002;
Lin & Zhou 2007) before. As an example, we showed that
both weak equivalence and strong equivalence can be cap-
tured in the logic of GK and the complexities for both of
them are coNP complete. We also showed that each rule
base in general default logic can be strongly equivalently
transformed into a set of rules of form (1), which cannot
be further transformed into disjunctive default rules. This
result can also be viewed as a generalization of a similar re-
sult for general logic programming (Ferraris 2005a) since
answer set programming is a special case of general default
logic. Meanwhile, it also indicates that, to some extent, gen-
eral default logic is a strict extension of disjunctive default
logic (Gelfond et al. 1991) (thus Reiter’s default logic (Re-
iter 1980)).
Finally, we proved that Moore’s auto-epistemic logic
(Moore 1987) is equivalent to a proper subset RA of gen-
eral default logic via the logic of GK. Hence, the self-
introspection operator L in auto-epistemic logic indeed
plays the same role as the double negation-as-failure opera-
tor −− in general default logic. Since Reiter’s default logic
(disjunctivedefault logic) can also be consideredas a proper
subset RN (RD) of general default logic, and RA and RN
(RD) are disjoint with each other, it can be concluded that
auto-epistemic logic and Reiter’s default logic are actually
two disjoint nonmonotonic formalisms. However, both of
them are proper subclasses of general default logic. As a
consequence, general default logic is a strict extension of
Reiter’s default logic (disjunctivedefault logic). Indeed, this
factisalsoconﬁrmedbyGottlob’sresult(Gottlob1995),sta-
ting that auto-epistemic logic cannot be translated into Re-
iter’sdefaultlogicbyamodulartranslationwithoutauxiliary
atoms.
To sum up, in comparison with related work of transla-
tions among nonmonotonic formalisms, we are not only in-
terested in the translation itself, but also interested in the
beneﬁts of it. As we have shown in this paper, the transla-
tion from general default logic into the logic of GK is in-
deed useful. First of all, it conﬁrms the generality of the
logic of GK. And then, it solves a number of important
problems in relation to general default logic via the logic of
GK. Last but not least, it provides better understandings of
both two nonmonotonicformalisms and others, for instance,
auto-epistemic logic.
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In the appendix,we outline the proofsketches of some prop-
erties presented in this paper.
Proof:[proof of Lemma 1] We prove this assertion by in-
duction on the structure of R.
• If R is a fact, then this assertion holds obviously.
• IfR is R1|R2, thenRT2 is weaklyequivalentto R
T2
1 |R
T2
2 .
T1 |= RT2 iff T1 |= R
T2
1 |R
T2
2 iff T1 |= R
T2
1 or T1 |= R
T2
2
iff M is a model of (R1)GK or M is a model of (R2)GK
iff M is a model of RGK.
• If R is R1 & R2, then RT2 is weakly equivalent to
R
T2
1 &R
T2
2 . T1 |= RT2 iff T1 |= R
T2
1 &R
T2
2 iff T1 |= R
T2
1
and T1 |= R
T2
2 iff M is a model of (R1)GK and M is a
model of (R2)GK iff M is a model of RGK.
• If R is R1 ⇒ R2, then RT2 is weakly equivalent to
R
T2
1 ⇒ R
T2
2 . T1 |= RT2 iff T1 |= R
T2
1 ⇒ R
T2
2 iff
T1  |= R
T2
1 or T1 |= R
T2
2 iff M is not a model of (R1)GK
or M is a model of (R2)GK iff M is a model of RGK.
This completes the induction proof.
Proof:[proof of Theorem 2] ⇒: Suppose that T is an ex-
tension of ∆. Construct a Kripke interpretation M such that
K(M) = A(M) = T. By Lemma 1, M is a model of
∆GK. Moreover, M is a GK model of ∆GK. Otherwise,
suppose M1 is a model of ∆GK and K(M1) ⊂ K(M),
A(M1) = A(M) = T. By Lemma 1, K(M1) |= ∆T. This
shows that T is not an extension of ∆, a contradiction.
⇐: Suppose that there is a GK model M of ∆GK such
that K(M) = A(M) = T. By Lemma 1, T |= ∆T.
Moreover, there is no proper subset T1 of T such that T1 is
also a model of ∆T. Otherwise, we can construct a Kripke
interpretation M1 such that K(M1) = T1 and A(M1) = T.
By Lemma 1, M1 is also a model of ∆GK. This shows that
M is not a GK model of ∆GK, a contradiction.
Proof:[proof of Proposition 5] Let M be a model of F.
Let Γ bethe set offacts that F is constructedfrom. Let Γ1 =
{G|G ∈ Γ,M |= K(G)}. Then,foreveryP ∈ Γ\Γ1, there
is a truth assignmentsatisﬁes Q∧
V
G∈Γ1 G. Symmetrically,
the same thing can be done for modal operator A.
Construct a Kripke interpretation M1 such that the K
accessible worlds of the actual world are exactly the truth
assignments mentioned above, so are the A accessible
worlds. Then, for all formula G ∈ Γ, M |= K(G) iff
M1 |= K(G); M |= A(G) iff M1 |= A(G). Hence, M1
is also a model of F. Moreover, M1 has at most 2|F| + 1
possible worlds.
Proof:[proof of Theorem 9] 2 ⇒ 3 and 4 ⇒ 1 are obvi-
ous.
3 ⇒ 4 : Firstly, if
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F) |= (R1)GK ↔
(R2)GK, then R1 and R2 are weakly equivalent. Thus, by
Theorem 7, (R1)A and (R2)A are equivalent in the logic of
GK. By inductiononthe structure, (R3)GK and(R4)GK are
equivalent. Thus they have the same set of GK models. By
Theorem 2, R3 and R4 have the same set of extensions.
1 ⇒ 2 : Suppose otherwise M is a model of (R1)GK but
not a model of (R2)GK. Let T1 be K(M) and T2 be A(M).
There are two cases. (a)T2 |= R
T2
2 . Let R3 be the rule
conjunction of {F | F ∈ Fact(R1 & R2),T1 |= F} and
{F ⇒ G|F,G ∈ Fact(R1&R2);T2 |= F,G;T1  |= F,G.}.
We have that T2 is an extension of R2 & R3 but not an
extension of R1 & R3. (b)T2  |= R
T2
2 . Let R3 be the rule
conjunction of {F | F ∈ Fact(R1 & R2),T2 |= F}. We
have that T2 is an extension of R1&R3 but not an extension
of R2 & R3. In both cases, R1 is not strongly equivalent to
R2, a contradiction.
Proof:[proofof Proposition13] (F ∧G)GK is K(F ∧G);
while (F &G)GK is FGK ∧GGK, which is K(F)∧K(G).
Thus, (F ∧ G)GK is equivalent to (F & G)GK in the logic
of GK. By Theorem 9, F ∧ G ≡ F & G.
Proof:[proof of Proposition 15] All these assertions can
be proved the same way as the proof of Proposition 13 by
Theorem 9. As an example, here we only outline the proof
of 13.
Notice that if |=
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F), then by induc-
tion on the structure, for every rule R, RGK |= RA. Con-
sider 13, ((F ⇒ G) | H)GK is
((FGK → GGK) ∧ (FA → GA)) ∨ HGK,
which is equivalent to
(¬FGK ∨ GGK ∨ HGK) ∧ (¬FA ∨ GA ∨ HGK)
under
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F). On the other hand,
((F ⇒ G | H) & (H | − F | − −G))GK
is equivalent to
(FGK → GGK∨HGK)∧(FA → GA∨HA)∧(HGK∨¬FA∨GA),
which is also equivalent to
(¬FGK ∨ GGK ∨ HGK) ∧ (¬FA ∨ GA ∨ HGK),
under
V
F∈L K(F) → A(F). Thus by Theorem 9, 13
holds.
Proof:[proof of Theorem 18] We ﬁrst prove a lemma by
induction on the structure that each rule base is strongly
equivalent to a set of rules of the form C ⇒ D, where D
has the form of (3), and C has the form of
C1&...&Cn&−Cn+1&...&−Cm&−−Cm+1&...&−−Ck,
where Ci,(1 ≤ i ≤ k) are propositional clauses. A
tedious step of proving this lemma is to reduce the rule
(C1 ⇒ D1) & (C2 ⇒ D2) ⇒ (C3 ⇒ D3) mainly by
14 and 15 in Proposition 15.
Then, by 9, 16 and 17 in Proposition 15, this form can be
strongly equivalently transformed to form (1).
Proof:[Proof of Theorem 22] Point 1 and point 2 follow
easily from Theorem 3 and 4 in (Zhou, Lin, & Zhang
2007) and Corollary 14. Point 3 follows from Corollary 14
and the fact that −R1 & R2 ⇒ R3 is strongly equivalent
toR2 ⇒ R3|−−R1, whereR1,R2 andR3 arethreerules.